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ABSTRACT
The American University in Cairo, Egypt
Name: Esraa Aziz Mokhtar Muhammad Makled
Supervisors: Prof. Hassanein H. Amer and Dr. Ramez M. Daoud
Wireless Networked Control Systems (WNCS) have recently emerged as a
replacement for wired control networks. Wireless networked control systems are more
suitable for environments that require higher flexibility and robustness.
In previous literature a wireless manufacturing line was proposed. The work-cells
communication was through IEEE 802.11 technologies and a switched Ethernet
backbone. This thesis is aiming to improve the current solution by adding a supervisor
to the existing system. The supervisor could be either in passive or active mode.
Passive supervisor would intervene when all controllers in the network fail, while
active supervisor would act once any controller on the line fail.
The system was simulated using OPNET software with 95% confidence analysis.
The ability of the system to withstand external interference was assessed through
adding a single band jammer to the OPNET simulation. The system was able to hold
up to 8KB interfering file sent from a single band jammer affecting the full Wi-Fi
spectrum. All results were subjected to a 95% confidence analysis
The performability of passive and active supervisor systems was compared. A
Markov model of both systems was built. It was shown that by time, the
performability of a passive supervisor system is enhanced while that of an active
supervisor system degraded. However, the active supervisor showed a better
performability in all cases.

.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Networked control systems research is one of the pillars of the industrial
development. Since the introduction of digital systems to the field of control systems,
the need for communication between field nodes and controllers emerged. Thus, it
was essential to provide a networking environment that supports the communication
of the field nodes with controllers.
The networking environment used is similar to conventional networks at the
physical level, however has different requirements in implementation. In Networked
Control Systems (NCSs), field devices like sensors send small packets at a certain
frequency to the controller. The controller processes the data and takes a decision.
Then, the decision is forwarded to the actuators, which implements the action on the
field [1-3].
One of the main differences between conventional networks and networked control
systems is the need for accurate timing, error free communication and deeper
hierarchy [4-7]. These requirements in addition to the need of being highly
deterministic elected CAN (Controller Area Network) and PROFIBUS technologies,
at first, to prevail the market of NCS [8-10].
By time, technological advancement of communication protocols unfolded. Also, a
level of flexibility was allowed in NCS. These factors encouraged the incorporation of
non-deterministic protocols like Ethernet, PROFlNET, EtherNetlIP, Time- Triggered
Ethernet (IT Ethernet) and Flexible IT Ethernet to position themselves as players in
the NCS market [10-15].
Currently, there is a trend to resolute to wireless solutions. Similar to the case with
the Ethernet earlier, moving to wireless has become a trend because it is more
efficient in terms of cost and time [8]. Moreover, it provides freedom, robustness and
ability to work in hazardous environment. In addition, wireless solutions reduce the
probability of cable damage [8]. Hence, allows for freer equipment motion. These
factors made the introduction of Wireless Networked Control Systems (WNCSs) a
normal evolution to the networked control systems in industrial automation [8].
WNCSs decreases operational cost and simplifies installation. Main technologies
used for WNCS are Bluetooth, Zigbee and WLAN [8]. A commercially available
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solution is WISA (Wireless Interface of sensors and Actuators) by ABB (ASEA
Brown Boveri) [16,17]. WISA uses modified Bluetooth for communication of nodes.
Another WNCS system was introduced in research in [18]. The system in [18] uses
standard 802.11 technologies and switched Ethernet for communication between its
nodes [19, 20]. The system has 30 sensors and 30 actuators connected through Wi-Fi
to two access points. The access points are connected to a controller through switched
Ethernet [18-20]. The system was able to fulfill the needed requirements for NCS
including error-free timed communication.
The model in [18] was improved gradually. Concatenation of two cells was
introduced in [21]. The concatenation of three cells was made possible in [22,23]. The
system was able to withstand interference without affecting its performance in the
case of the failure of two out of three controllers.
As mentioned in [8], the deep hierarchy is one of the main characteristics of
industrial networks. Deep hierarchy differentiates industrial networks from
commercial networks. The term deep hierarchy indicates that the control network
would have a lot of layers, like field devices, control devices, human interface,
supervisor layer or database. Each layer could be served using different protocol.
In this study, hierarchical networks would be introduced to the system in [22] by
adding a supervisor to the three concatenated cells to monitor the performance of the
three controllers. The supervisor would follow the previous approach in [24-26] to be
either active or passive supervisor. Active supervisor would takeover any controller
function in case of a controller failure. Meanwhile, in passive supervisor mode the
supervisor would intervene only if all three controllers failed. The system would be
tested in the presence of interference. Performability study will be done to assess the
performance of the systems in both modes.
Section II starts with a literature survey of networked Control Systems in general.
This would be followed by debrief of WNCS for Industrial Automation existing
solutions with focus on the system in [18]. Overview of hierarchical networks in
NCS would be presented afterwards followed by a problem statement.
Section III studies the effect of adding a deeper hierarchical level to the system in
[21].

The research extends the system by adding a supervisor above the three

controllers. The study includes testing the possible configurations of fault-tolerance
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and recovery in the presence of supervisor. Additionally, the research includes testing
the robustness of the system against interference.
Section IV focuses on assessing the performance of the active and passive modes
using performability modeling. Section V would conclude the thesis.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
II.1. NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS (NCS)
Networked control systems share certain aspects that differentiate them from
typical communication networks [8]. These differences are: application, application
domain, hierarchy, failure severity, reliability, round trip time, determinism, data
composition, temporal consistency and operational environment. [8].

Networked

control systems are expected to be facilitating the communication of physical
equipment, like sensors and robotic arms, in a plant [8].
NCS has a deep hierarchical structure. A hierarchical example for NCS is a control
network composed of field devices, controllers and supervisors. Each level is separate
and may have an independent communication protocol from other levels on the
system [8].
The consequences of failures in NCS are high. A failure in an NCS can damage a
full manufacturing line, which can be extremely costly [8]. In addition, expected
environment for NCS is harsher than the environment for communication networks in
general due to the industrial environment needs [8]. This is mainly because in general
NCS networks are expected to operate in environments that are often experiencing
adverse conditions such as moisture, dust, heat and vibration [8]. Hence, NCS needs
to be robust and highly reliable.
NCS devices send small, frequent packets at consistent strict deadlines [8]. The
primary measure to choose the RTT value is that it should be less than the sampling
period of the end devices [8].
A NCS system can be time-triggered or event triggered depending on the presence
of a clock signal on the system [2]. If the system has a common clock, it would be
time triggered. Otherwise, the system would be event driven.
Sensors in a time-triggered system have constant sampling period. Hence, samples
are taken at discrete time points [2]. On the other hand, in an event-triggered system,
the sampling is continuous and the control process is triggered by a certain event. The
time taken by a packet to travel from sensor (S) to controller (K) and K to actuator
(A) (propagation/transmission delays) may or may not include processing time,
encapsulation, decapsulation and queuing delays, depending on the system design [2].
5

Industrial applications are categorized into real-time and non-real-time
applications. Real-time applications would require small, frequently exchanged
packets [1-3].

Real-time networks are divided between soft and hard real-time

systems [27-29]. Soft real time networks tolerate some packet losses and delays like
video and voice conferencing applications. Hard real times systems are less likely to
tolerate losses and high delays [27-29].
Deciding on whether a system needs a real time or non real time application
depends on the type of data being transmitted on the industrial network[8]. The data
types over a control network could be categorized into control, diagnostic or safety
information [8].
Control information is sent between instruments and the controllers and act either
as an input or output of controller [8]. This requires real time communication with
deterministic characteristics [8]. Example of control information would include
actuator position and fluid flow [8].
Diagnostic information is information collected but the controller is not required to
act upon [8]. The information is used to monitor the plant and its health [8].

This

type of information has much lower real time requirement [8].
The most strict hard real-time of all types is the safety information as the controller
needs to take immediate action based on the information it receives [8]. The type of
information of concern in this research is control information.
A basic NCS network would consist of sensors, controllers and actuators as shown
in Figure 1. The sensors send sample data from the manufacturing plant to the
controller. The controller processes the data and forwards the action needed to the
actuator. The actuator would apply the decision on the physical process.
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Figure 1: Basic NCS example [2]

Earlier, CAN and PROFIBUS dominated the field of NCS [9,10]. These protocols
provided the needed determinism and high predictability for the performance of
industrial network (6,8). The demand for higher bandwidth and accessibility, led nondeterministic protocols like Ethernet to be adopted in NCS [3,4,6-8,12,30,31].
One of the barriers that delayed the adoption of Ethernet technology for NCS realtime application is the utilization of Carrier Sense Multiple access with Collision
detection (CSMA/CD) [32]. The technique deploys the concept of binary exponential
backoff (BEB). In BEB, when the transmitting node detects a collision it back off for
a certain duration of time. The value of time varies between 0 and 2k – 1 time-slots,
where k is the number of collisions detected/avoided. Examples of modified Ethernet
are EtherNet/IP, Time-Triggered Ethernet (TT Ethernet) and Flexible TT Ethernet
(FTT Ethernet) [33-38]. Recently, unmodified Ethernet for use in real-time
applications has been standardized [14,15].
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II.2. WIRELESS NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS
For the past decade, a trend emerged within industrial networking to implement
fieldbus protocols using wireless technologies [38]. There are many motives to adopt
wireless technologies in NCS. Wireless technologies are cheaper to install and
maintain. The reduction in the wiring required for communication decrease
installation cost. Moreover, applying wireless technologies on machines that involve a
lot of motion, eliminate the cost and hazard of wear and tear of wires. In addition,
Wireless technologies on NCS grant accessibility to areas where cables could be
impractical, restricted or to hazardous environments [16-18]. Wireless technologies
are also faster and simpler to commission and reconfigure.
In spite of the benefits brought by wireless solutions, there are some obstacles
facing the development of a wireless networked control system. Some of the main
problems are that they cannot resist heavy interference and they are non-deterministic
due to non-static routes [8, 39].
When deciding upon incorporating wireless technologies to industrial networks,
there were two options; either reusing existing standard for conventional networks or
starting from scratch [8]. Reusing the existing wireless standards was preferred to
creating standards from scratch dedicated to WNCS. Utilizing the available physical
and data-link layers would reduce time and cost experienced [8].
Technologies using the unlicensed band were the most popular in the industrial
field. These included Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), Bluetooth and Zigbee
standards known as IEEE 802.11, 802.15.1 and 802.15.4 respectively [20,40,41].
Currently, available commercially is the Wireless Interface for Sensors and Actuators
(WISA) by ABB [16,17]. Another WNCS solution is proposed in literature is WNCS
system based on Wi-Fi [18,21-26].
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II.2.1. WIRELESS INTERFACE FOR SENSORS AND ACTUATORS
(WISA)
II.2.1.1. WISA SYSTEM
Several studies in the literature discussed wireless networked control systems
[16,17, 42-48]. A commercially available solution of WNCS is WISA by ABB [16,
17]. WISA provides a powering module and a communication module .The system
uses customized non-standardized Bluetooth for its wireless communication module
[16,17,40]. The communication module connects sensors, actuators and controllers.
The backbone is connected through a fieldbus. A typical WISA workcell is shown in
Figure 2 [16]. A workcell contains around 120 nodes in an area of 3×3m. Table 1[16]
shows some of the system attributes. The main set back of the WISA system is the use
of non-standardized protocols [49].
Table 1: WISA parameters [16]

Maximum number of nodes to one base station/Cell ID
Maximum latency from WISA air interface
Minimum distance to non-interfering WLAN/Bluetooth
Maximum number of WLANS within interfering distance
Maximum output RF power
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120
20ms
25/16 m
1
1 mw

Figure 2: WISA WORKCELL [16]

II.2.1.1. NOISE /INTERFERENCE IMMUNITY
One of the main drawbacks of WNCS is being more susceptible interference than
wired networks [16,17,46]. Some examples of those expected factors of noise on a
factory floor are heat, welding and/or mechanical vibration [16, 17, 46]. A
comprehensive experiment was done in [16] showing that factory floor noise
including but not limited to arc welding, heat and vibrations would saturate around
1.8 GHz [16,17,46]. Therefore, WISA operating in the 2.4 GHz band would be
immune to noises from the factory floor. The only interference expected to affect
WISA systems would be noise from equipment operating on the 2.4 GHz band.
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II.2.2. WLAN WNCS PREVIOUS WORK
II.2.2.1. SINGLE CELL MODEL [18]
Another model for WNCS used WLAN for wireless communication between its
nodes [18]. The backbone of the system proposed uses switched Ethernet as the
communication protocol [18]. Using off-the-shelf equipment made it an appealing
concept due to the simplicity of integration, cost-efficiency and compatibility. The
system uses strictly Switched Ethernet and IEEE 802.11b. The system used the
performance metrics and benchmarks of WISA system to measure its performance.
The model is built within a square workcell. The side of the square is 3m length [18].
The workcell consists of 30 sensors, 30 actuators and two Wi-Fi access points namely
(AP1 and AP2). The wireless load of the system is divided equally among the two
access points. Both access points need to communicate on non-interfering channels
(channels 1, 6 or 11). The model for single cell is shown in Figure 3.The system uses
1mW to transmit data at the rate of the 11 Mbps. The system payload is chosen to be a
10B User Datagram Packet (UDP) with a sampling period of 40ms. UDP is used
because it does not require acknowledgement. Hence, UDP is more suitable for real
time communication. The system provided good results with an ability to have
moving sensors and actuators pairs and withstanding interference [50, 18].

Figure 3: Single workcell with 802.11b
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II.2.2.2. CELL CONCATENATION
A. 802.11b System
A production line consists of more than one workcell. This motivated the research
of the possibility to concatenate several Wi-Fi WNCS workcells together [21]. All
cells should be operating using same Wi-Fi WNCS proposed in section II.2.2.1. The
workcells should operate within the allowable performance metrics and benchmarks.
The single cell model in II.2.2.1 required two access points (APs). In order to
avoid intersystem interference, each AP utilized one of the three non-interfering
channels (1,6 or 11) [21]. Adding a new cell necessitates the use of four channels.
Given there are only three non-interfering channels in 802.11b, one channel would
need to be reused.

The need to reuse ones of the channels created co-channel

interference. This required a minimum distance between the 2 cells of 2m, and PRPT
of -50. The model presented in [21] added 1m of guard distance to have a total of 3m
inter-cell distances. The non-reused channels were subjected to interference while
reused channels where locked from being used by any external nodes. The model
simulated by the study on OPNET is shown in Figure 4. The system was able to
satisfy the benchmarks required with a 95% confidence analysis.

B. 802.11g
In [22], 802.11g replaced 802.11b in section II.2.2.1. Due to the higher data rate of
802.11g, a single access point was able to support all SAs within a workcell. There
are several benefits due to this change. This change reduced delays and allowed for
concatenation of up to 3 cells with 0 inter-cell distance. The increased data rate also
allowed for fault-tolerance to be incorporated at the controller level (explained in
sectionII.2.4.1). Figure 5 shows the single cell model. The model, with all of its
variations, was simulated on OPNET and proved to be resilient to interference and to
satisfy the needed benchmarks.
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Figure 4: Two concatenated workcell on 802.11b [21]

Figure 5: Single cell model using 802.11g [22]
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II.2.3. HIERARCHICAL INDUSTRIAL NETWORKS
One of the main features of Industrial networks is a deep hierarchy [8]. The
hierarchy would include device level (including SAs), control level and information
level [42]. Figure 6 shows an example of Hierarchical Industrial Networks. Device
level is the lowest level on the hierarchy includes devices like robotic arms, sensors,
valves, relays…etc [42]. Control level is where most of the control decisions of the
systems are being taken [42]. Control level could be divided into two types of
control, cell sublevel and area sublevel [42]. Cell sublevel is where the controller has
its basic control function towards one cell [42]. Area sublevel would include
supervisors over multiple controllers [42]. Information level is where servers and
information about the system are being kept [42].

Figure 6: Hierarchical Industrial Networks [42]
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II.2.4. FAULT TOLERANCE
One attractive research topic is fault-tolerance. In normal systems, if one
component fails, the services operated by that component will be totally lost, which
might lead to system failure. In a fault-tolerant system, the system can fully operate in
case of failure of one or more component. The performance may be degraded, but the
operation would not fail [51-57]. Downtimes are often costly. Fault tolerance systems
are appealing because they reduce downtime.
Applying fault-tolerance to a system happens at a cost too. In order to quantify the
increased reliability of the system, reliability-modeling techniques are used.
Reliability models are mathematical models that involve accurate data concerning
potential failure rates. Another metric is increase performability of the system in
different forms: steady state and cumulative performability [58-59]. Performability
relates the expected failure rates and rewards of different states on the system [58-59].

II.2.4.1. FAULT TOLERANCE IN WI-FI WNCS ON THE CONTROLLER
LEVEL

The studies in section II.2.2.2 allowed for the concatenation of two or more cells,
thus two or more controllers on the same production line. The presence of more than
one controller encouraged the study of fault tolerance on the controller level.
Controllers are on the second hierarchical level after the field equipment (sensors
and actuators). Controllers on production lines are intelligent and powerful and can be
assigned different tasks [60]. The application of fault-tolerance on the controller level
was applied in [61, 22].
If any of the controllers failed, one of the neighboring controllers would takeover
the control functions. In order to be able to achieve this all controllers are connected
through 1GbE connection. Also, watchdog packets are exchanged between all
controllers. Watchdog packets are sent at half the control-sampling period to insure
that all packets arrive safely even in case of failure. In addition, data from all sensors
is sent to all controllers on the manufacturing line. So, in case of failure of one
controller, another can immediately replace and take corrective actions.
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Systems were simulated in fault-free and in situation where controllers went faulty
and were able to continue operation within the designated benchmarks of 40ms endto-end delay and zero packets drops (95% confidence analysis).

II.2.4.2. FAULT TOLERANCE ON THE SUPERVISOR LEVEL IN NCS
Supervisor level could also be used to provide for fault-tolerance of controllers
level. Supervisors can provide protection against failures of the controllers in two
modes: Passive mode and Active mode. A supervisor operating in the passive mode
(Passive supervisor) would intervene with the control process if and only if all the
controllers under its area fail. However, if the supervisor is in the active mode (active
supervisor) once any controller fails, the supervisor would intervene and claim the
control load of the faulty controller/s. This was previously applied in industrial NCS
network in [26] and on NCS networks on trains in [24, 25].
One example of hierarchical fault tolerance in NCS is [24,25]. The research
studied the performance of a single GbE two-wagon train control network. The
network has two types of loads: control and entertainment. A wagon has two servers.
One server is designated to entertainment, while the other carries the control load.
Both wagons are interconnected to a supervisor. The supervisor was studied to be
passive in [24] and active in [25]. The network operated properly even after the
failure of all Controllers and Entertainment Servers; the Supervisor was able to
successfully carry the control load of both wagons. It was shown that the packet endto end delays met the control requirements and that no packet was lost. The study
showed that the architecture with active supervisor kept entertainment available for
the passengers in more of the system states when compared to the architecture of
passive supervisor. Simulations for the systems were done on OPNET simulation
software.
In [26], also the passive and active supervisor models were studied.

Active

supervisor takes part in the control scheme and has a role in inter-machine
synchronization. Accordingly, supervisor failure drives the whole system to stop
operation. Passive supervisor collects information and does not intervene in control
scheme unless necessarily. When the last controller fails, the supervisor takes control
of machines. The scenario was done on two machines and three machines systems. In
both cases it was shown that best back-up scenario for failed controller is again to be
16

replaced by the supervisor, not by one of its neighboring controllers. This would
conclude that previous literature have recommended active supervisor over passive
supervisor in terms of the performance.
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II.3. MULTICASTING
Another study that targeted improving the system in section II.2.1 introduced
multicasting [61]. Multicasting allows the system to have fault tolerance capability
without the need to duplicate the sensors data on the wireless medium. Figure 7.shows
the difference between applying multicasting vs. applying unicasting. K1 and K2 are
two controllers without multicasting; fault tolerance would include adding more
overheads on the wireless network. Each sensor had to replicate its data streams
(green and blue arrows) so it would send one data stream per controller. So, the
wireless network load was duplicated. The controller will not need to replicate its data
to the actuator in all cases (blue arrow).
Introducing Multicasting, the sensors would send only one single stream to the
access point, regardless of the number of controllers involved in the fault tolerance
process. The access point would act as a rendezvous point. A rendezvous point
duplicates data as needed and sends it to the targeted controllers. Therefore, traffic on
the air link will remain the same in all cases. This would improve the system
performance and increase the ability of the system to tolerate interference over the air
link.

(A)Unicasting

(B)Multicasting

Figure 7: Multicasting vs. Unicasting

__ K1 to actuator
- - Sensor data copy 1
- - Sensor data copy 2
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II.4. INTERFERENCE STUDY
As mentioned in section II.2.1.1, on a factory floor environment the only
interference that could harm the system would be due to another communication on
the 2.4 GHz band. In [17] it was shown that all factory floor environment actions like
arc welding and mechanical vibrations would settle at around the 1.8 GHz, hence
could not affect a system operating in the ISM band.
The research in [62] studied in depth all types on interference that could affect the
system in section II.2.2.1. The study used OPNET [63] to simulate interference over
the system.
The paper divided interference into 3 types:
a) Network Congestion
b) Medium Congestion
c) Jammers
Network congestions happen when alien nodes communicate with the workcells.
These could be maintenance engineer for example. The paper in [62] had two alien
nodes placed around the cell as shown in Figure 8. One was placed on the left and the
other on the right. Both nodes would communicate to the controller using an FTP
application. The increased congestion above the Wi-Fi would lead to an increase of
interference over the cell. The results show an exponential increase in delay with the
increase in FTP file sizes, due to the congestion of the network. For this model, the
maximum allowable FT file size that the system can withstand was found to be
33Kbytes
The second form of interference studied was medium congestion. In medium
congestion another independent Wi-Fi networks would operate in the vicinity of the
work cell over the same Wi-Fi channels. The model presented in this study has two
alien Wi-Fi nodes communicating together (instead of with the controller in the
network congestion). The communication is done using one of the channels utilized
by the Work cell. Both channels would give nearly identical results as they do not
interfere with each other. The largest size of file tolerated by the system is 28 Kbytes,
which is less than that in the case of network congestion by 15%.
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Figure 8: Interference Nodes Location as Shown on OPNET simulation [62]

Jammers are nodes that interfere with the communication intentionally. In factory
environment, jammers would represent an ambient interference. In order to simulate a
Jammer, the study chose the single band jammer. The single band jammer would
continuously target a fixed frequency band by sending one packet every interval of
time. In order to maximize jammer interference, [61] targeted the channels used by
the Workcell to be attacked by the jammer.
The single band jammer had two variables to be investigated, the size of packet
and the interval of sending the packet. First experiment included changing the interarrival period between two consecutive packets and keeping the packet size constant
at 2Kbytes and 5Kbytes. It was found that decreasing the inter-arrival period causes
an increase in end-to-end delay. At very low inter-arrival times, the delay exceeded
the time constraint of 36ms and control packets were dropped. The reason behind this
is the increase in the rate of congesting the medium by continuously retransmitting
over short time periods. It was observed that the minimum inter- arrival period that
does not lead to exceeding the time constraint is 46ms at 2Kbytes packet. The
minimum acceptable inter-arrival time increased to 200ms at 5Kbytes packet size.
The next experiment was fixing the inter-arrival time to 500ms, and changing the
file size. The maximum packet size that can be tolerated by the network in case of a
single band jammer is at most 8Kbytes. This concluded that jammers are the most
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severe type of noise that network could be subjected to. The jammer is idealized in
order to be able to quantify for the damage and to compare it with other systems in
future.
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III. PROPOSED MODEL
Research in this thesis is aiming to incorporate hierarchical architecture to the
system described in Section II.2.2.2.B. The system has three workcells. Each of the
workcells has its own controller. A supervisor would be added over the three cells.
The supervisor would deepen the hierarchy of the system, hence expected to improve
the performance as shown in previous work described in section II.2.3. The supervisor
would have two modes either active or passive as described in literature review
section II.2.3. Active supervisor would takeover once any controller fails. Passive
supervisor would takeover only if all controllers fail. The resilience of the model to
interference is tested using a single band jammer as suggested by literature review in
chapter II.4. The model reliability would be assessed using Markov models and
performability measures.

III.1. TOPOLOGY
The proposed model topology is shown in Figure 9. A conveyer belt topology is
modeled in this research. The conveyer belt connects three work-cells. Each cell has
30 wireless sensors and 30 wireless actuators. One controller manages all the devices
within a work-cell. A supervisor monitors all three controllers on the conveyer belt.
The wireless communication in each cell follows the IEEE 802.11g protocol. A
work-cell would have an AP that supports the interface between wireless and wired
communication on the system. The AP is connected to the controller (K) via an
Ethernet switch, and provides the Wi-Fi communication medium for the wireless
modules. The three switches on the conveyer belt are connected together. All switches
are also connected to one final switch. The final switch is connected to the supervisor.
All switched Ethernet connections are done using standard 1 GbE fiber optics cables.
The supervisor is added to the system in order to increase its lifetime and reliability.
Hence, the supervisor is expected to be the most costly, robust and reliable node on
the system. Therefore, The switches are expected to fail last.
Each work cell operates in an area of 3m×3m [18]. The switches, controllers and
supervisor are not within the operation field of the system hence are allowed to be off
the 3m×3m area. For the purpose of the study it will be assumed that the switches,
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controller and supervisor are out of the operation area. This would be expected to
slightly increase the system latency, but is a more likely to happen in real life model.

Figure 9: Proposed Model [65]

Sensors would start their action in the field by gathering data and forwarding it to
the controller through the AP. The data is sent in the form of stream of packets, of
size 10 bytes each. Therefore, if all packets arrived it is insured that the operation was
done successfully. Sensors send packet at a sampling period of 40ms.
Applying fault tolerance directly to the system would need large data to be
transmitted over the air link. The data would be quadrupled, at some scenarios, by
every sensor. The large amount of data would cause high traffic and delay over the air
link. In order to facilitate the transport of data, and improve the performance of the
system multicasting was used.
In multicasting, each sensor would send only one stream of packets to a
rendezvous point. IP multicasting groups are defined to the rendezvous point. The
rendezvous point duplicates the sensor data and send the data as needed to the
multicasting groups. Destinations and the number of copies are determined by the
supervisor mode.
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The system should abide by some benchmarks in order to be considered a
successful WNCS system. The delay on the system should not exceed 36ms end-toend delay between sensors and actuators in any condition or status of the system.
There should be no dropped packets or errors. The choice of 36 ms gives a safety
margin of 10% from the sampling period of the sensors. Hence, there would be no
way the sensor sends a new packet before the earlier packet has reached the actuator.
To simplify further explanation the following terminology would be used across
the research:
1. Controller of upper cell: K1
2. Controller of middle cell: K2
3. Controller of bottom cell: K3
4. Supervisor: S

III.2. PASSIVE SUPERVISOR
As mentioned earlier, the supervisor has two main modes either passive or active. In
the passive mode, the supervisor would only intervene when all controllers fail.
Therefore, when one controller fails, another controller would takeover and not the
supervisor. The supervisor would support for the control functions of all controllers if
and only if all controllers failed.
For the controllers on the same level to hold the function of each other in case of
failure, they all need to be aware of the status of each other and all the data concerned.
Also, on the occasion that all controllers fail at the time, the supervisor should be
aware of the full profile of the three controllers, including data and decisions, at all
times in case it needs to carry over the control functions. Such an arrangement would
facilitate a smooth takeover of control. Hence watchdog packets are exchanged
between controllers and each other and between controllers and the supervisor.
Another watchdog packets exchanged on a much longer interval between sensors/
actuators and the controllers. These watchdog packets notify the sensors and actuators
that a certain controller failed and hence they would stop addressing it.
For the seamless transmission, all the sensor data on the system needs to be
communicated to all functioning controllers at any instance. Also, the data needs to be
forwarded to the supervisor. Figure 10 shows the data flow of the fault-free scenario.
As shown, the sensor would send one data stream to the AP. The AP would quadruple
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the data it receives from all sensors. Then the AP forwards a copy of data stream to
each controller and a copy to the supervisor. The controller would process the data of
the cells it is managing. The controller would then forward the data it processed to
the designated actuators. If one controller fails, another controller will do the
processing and forwarding of the data of the failed controller. In case all three
controllers fail, the supervisor would process the data for all cells and forward the
decisions to the responsible actuators. Figure 11 shows the case when K1 fails and K3
took over its control functions. The AP no more needs to quadruple its data it only
triples it. And instead of K1 replying to the actuator, K3 replies.
In order to support for such a configuration, all devices in the control plane
(controllers and supervisors), need to be aware of each other status at all times. This
would necessitate the exchange of watchdog packets between the control devices as
shown in Figure 12.Watchdog packets should be sent at half of the sampling period to
insure no data loss at any point in time. The watchdog packets are modeled as FTP
packets of the size of 64 bytes, at 20ms difference from each other.

- - - Sensor to AP
- - - Sensor to K2
- - -Sensor to K3
- - -Sensor to S
- - -K3 to A

Figure 10: Sensor Actuator Data Flow for Fault-Free Passive Supervisor
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- - - Sensor to AP
- - - Sensor to K2
- - -Sensor to K3
- - - Sensor to S
- - -K3 to Actuator
Figure 11: Sensor Actuator data flow for K1 fail K3 TO passive super visor

Watchdog between:
__S and Ks

__K1 and K2
__K2 and K3
__K3 and K1

Figure 12: Watchdog flow for Passive Supervisor Fault-Free
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Table 2: Possible states of passive supervisor

Working

Failed

Taking over

K1,K2,K3,S

_

_

K2,K3,S

K1

K2

K2,K3,S

K1

K3

K1,K3,S

K2

K1

K1,K3,S

K2

K3

K1,K2,S

K3

K1

K1,K2,S

K3

K2

K1,S

K2,K3

K1

K2,S

K1,K3

K2

K3,S

K1,K2

K3

S

K1,K2,K3

S
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III.3. ACTIVE SUPERVISOR
Active supervisor would intervene once any of the controllers fail. Once a
controller fails, active supervisor would takeover its control actions from data
processing and forwarding the decisions to actuator. In this topology, the supervisor is
the only node that needs to be fully aware of the data on the system. Controllers are
not expected to takeover each other functions at any point in time, hence it does not
need to be updated with each other status, and therefore less watchdog packets are
exchanged. Only the supervisor would need to have full status of all controllers and
all the sensor data for all cells on the conveyer belt. Therefore, the rendezvous point
(AP) will only need to duplicate the data as shown in Figure 13. Also, watchdog
packets will be exchanged between the supervisor from one side, and all the
controllers from the other as shown in Figure 15. Another watchdog packets sent from
controller to sensors and actuators on a much longer interval. This watchdog packet
notifies the sensors and actuators that a certain controller failed and hence they would
stop addressing it. Therefore, the access point would just forward the data from the
sensor to the supervisor with no need to duplicate as shown in Figure 14.All possible
states of an active supervisor mode are shown in Table 3.

- - - Sensor to K1
- - -Sensor to S
- - -S to Actuator

Figure 13: Sensor-Actuator Data Flow in Active Supervisor Fault-free
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- - - Sensor to AP
- - -Sensor to S
- - -S to Actuator

Figure 14: Sensor-Actuator Data Flow Active Supervisor K1 Fail

Watchdog between:
__S and Ks

Figure 15: Watchdog Data Flow for Active Supervisor Fault-free
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Table 3: Possible states of active supervisor

Working

Failed

Taking over

K1,K2,K3,S

_

_

K2,K3,S

K1

S

K1,K3,S

K2

S

K1,K2,S

K3

S

K1,S

K2,K3

S

K2,S

K1,K3

S

K3,S

K1,K2

S

S

K1,K2,K3

S
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III.4. INTERFERENCE
In spite of the different system loads in active and passive supervisor, the wireless
link on both modes will always be the same. This is due to multicasting. Multicasting
allows each sensor to send only a single stream of packets over the air link. Then the
multicasting rendezvous point (AP) would duplicate the stream as necessary. Also,
this implies that the air link delay for all the possible states of the system (irrespective
of the number of faulty /active controllers) will be nearly the same.
Concluding from the above, there would be no need to model interference on all the
possible scenarios. Only a single scenario would be sufficient to model the
interference.
Based on the study in section II.4, there are three main types of interference,
Network congestion, medium congestion and jammers. It was found that jammers are
the most threatening for the system.
To model interference, a single band jammer would be interfering every 500ms
over the full Wi-Fi spectrum. The jammer blocks the 2.4 GHz band. In order to
examine the jammer thoroughly, the jammer would go around the perimeter of the
three workcells. This will determine the system’s susceptibility to interference and
quantify the interference level that can be tolerated without violating the time
constraint or dropping data.
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III.5. DELAY CALCULATIONS
In order to calculate the expected delay of the system, three steps are taken:
•

Assessing the fairness and control effect on the delay

•

Calculating the wireless delay

•

Calculating the Ethernet delay

III.5.1. FAIRNESS CALCULATIONS
Based on [64], if two users are accessing the same AP, and are sharing the same
wireless channel conditions, they will have equal chances of transmitting a packet at
in a given slot time. This is explained by equation 1.
Equation (1) represents the access of the nodes to the medium. Given a network
with N users, is the user number, 𝐹! 𝑚 , the fairness of the network during a timeslot
m, is measured through (1).

𝐹! 𝑚 =

(
𝑁

!

𝛾)
!!! !

!

(1)

!
!
!!! 𝛾!

𝑖:

The user number

𝛾! :

The fraction of transmissions performed by UE i during a time slot m,

m:

Time slot on the network

N:

Number of users on the network

𝐹! 𝑚 :

The Jain fairness index of the network during a timeslot m
When 𝐹! 𝑚 equals 1, the network is considered a network with equal chances

for all users to access at any time slot.
Applying the equation to the proposed model in section III, all 30 sensors and
30 actuators in the same cell have same channel conditions and access same channel.
All field devices are trying to access the same AP. Assuming the similarity in channel
conditions for all sensors in one workcell, then (

!
!
!!! γ! )

=N

!
!
!!! γ! .

Therefore, all

the users will have the same probability of sending data [6]. This will help in
calculating the wireless delay on the payload.
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III.5.2. DISTRIBUTED COORDINATION FUNCTION
The main medium access protocol in IEEE 802.11 is Distributed Coordination
function (DCF) [20]. DCF allows for automatic medium sharing between compatible
PHYs [20]. The sharing is done through the use of Carrier Sense mechanisms [20].
There are two types of Carrier sense techniques that should be done: physical and
virtual mechanisms [20]. The physical mechanism is the Carrier Sense Multiple
Access with Collision Avoidance CSMA/CA and a random back off time, in case the
medium was in a busy condition [20].
CSMA/CA targets the reduction of the collision probability between multiple
Stations accessing a medium at the time when most collisions are expected to occur.
The time when a medium is sensed to be idle after it was busy (as indicated by Carrier
Sensing function) is the most probable time of collisions [20]. All stations that were
waiting to send their data would start sending [20]. Hence, collisions are most
probable at that time [20]. In order to avoid such collisions, Back off procedure is
used to resolve the contention conflicts [20].
For a station to transmit data, it senses the medium to check if another STA is
transmitting [20]. In case the medium was not determined as busy, the transmission
would proceed normally [20]. The CSMA/CA necessitates that there should be a
minimum gap of idle duration between consecutive frame sequences [20]. The idle
time between consecutive frames is DCF Inter-frame Space (DIFS) [20].

A

transmitting station should insure that the medium is idle for the full-required duration
before it starts sending [20].
In case the station determined that the medium is busy, it shall wait till the end of
the current transition [20]. After the transmission is ended and the medium is sensed
to be idle, the STA needs to select a random back-off time then send. The STA starts
to decrement the back-off interval counter while the medium is idle. The receiver then
waits for a short time interval between frame spaces (Short Interframe Space - SIFS)
and sends an acknowledgement that it received the packet [66].
A transmission is considered successful in 2 cases:
•

The sending STA receives an ACK from the addressed STA

•

When a frame with a group address is transmitted completely
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Virtual Carrier Sensing mechanisms are used to refine the physical carrier sensing
mechanisms. The virtual mechanisms may be used under different circumstances to
further minimize colliding incidences. The method depends on the Network
Allocation Vector (NAV) that stores the location of nodes and expected sending time.
This is achieved by distributing reservation information in order to announce the
intention to use the medium. The distribution could be done. One way to achieve
such a reservation is through the exchange of Request To Send (RTS) and Clear To
Send (CTS) frames. The CTS and RTS frames have a duration field the states the
period of time that is needed to be reserved in order to complete the transmission of
the actual frame and the ACK frame. A STA receiving either CTS (from the
destination STA) or RTS (from the source station) will reserve the medium for the
duration indicated
RTS/CTS exchange acts as a type of fast collision interference and a transmission
path check. Given the RTS frame is shorter than the data, it would be faster to detect
the loss of an RTS (through a missed CTS) rather than the loss of a data frame
(through ACK). This allows for faster collision detection, thus faster retransmission
and medium access.
One of the main problems resolved by the 4-way handshake system, RTS/CTS is
the hidden node problem.
RTS/CTS mechanism is also beneficial in case where multiple BSSs using the
same channel overlap. The medium reservation mechanism would be effective across
the BSS boundaries. The RTS/CTS mechanism could also improve operation in a
situation where all STAs are able to communicate with the AP, but might not be able
to receive from all other STAs. This is called Hidden node problem.
In spite of it benefits and advantages, RTS/CTS mechanism, unlike CSMA/CA, is
not used for every data frame transmission. The main drawback of the system is the
additional overhead caused by the RTS and CTS frames. The additional overhead
causes the system to be inefficient especially for short data frames.
CTS-To-self was built to avoid such an overhead, where the sender sends a CTSto-self, which would be heard by all nodes. Then nodes will not transmit in the
transmission period. This would prevent collisions in the case of the absence of
hidden nodes to the sender. Given the importance of deadlines, and having an errorcommunication, one of the virtual protection mechanisms would be used.
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The main f of CTS/RTS over CTS-to-self is that CTS/RTS deals with the hidden
node problem. If a node was not able to hear the RTS by the sender, should be able to
hear the CTS from the receiver and hence stop sending [69].
According to [70], the system under study should not suffer from hidden node
problem. Hence it would be sufficient to use CTS-to-Self protection scheme rather
than CTS/RTS.
In the system studied, wireless LAN at 3×3 m is modeled using a free space
channel model. Equation (2) from [70] shows the condition for the number of to be
zero
𝑛! 𝑟 = 0    𝑖𝑓  𝐸 𝑟 ≽ 𝐼 𝑟 + 𝑟        

(2)

I(r) represent the distant in which nodes would be interfering with the
communication between two nodes. E is the range in which any communication
provided by node can be detected. E and I (r) are calculated as in [70]:
!

(3)

  I r = r TR !"       

E   =

!

(4)

P!" (A)
α. TR !"

(4π)!
α =    !
𝜆 𝐺! 𝐺!

(5)

𝜆 = 𝑐/𝑓

(6)

Where:
•

Ptx(A):

Transmission power of node A

•

α:

Channel gain

•

TRCP:

Capture Ratio

•

TRCS :

Carrier Sense Threshold

•

r:

Distance between the sending and receiving nodes.

•

Gt, Gr :

Transmission and reception gains 0db

•

λ:

Wavelength
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•

c:

Speed of light

•

f:

Operating frequency

•

β:

Path loss exponent

In the model studied, Ptx(A) is 0 dbm, TRCS is −95dbm, capture ratio TRcp is 10 db
[68,70]. β is 2 for free space channel model. α is calculated for a free space channel
model as shown in equations (5-6).
The distance r is the distance between the sensor/actuator and the AP. The
maximum possible r would be the distance between a node on the edge of the
workcell and the AP. Given the AP is placed in the middle of the cell, the workcell is
a 3m×3m square, the distance between the furthest node and the AP would be half of
the diagonal of a 3m×3m square. To calculate the distance r, Pythagoras rules are
used. The resulted r would be 2.12m.
Using those numbers it is shown that E>I(r)+r. Hence, no hidden node problem is
observed in the model. Given that the system is time sensitive, and that there is no
hidden node problem, CTS-to-Self is used.

Table 4: Variables for Hidden node

Variable

Value

Ptx(A)

1 mw

TRCP

10 db

TRCS

-95 dbm

r

2.21 m

Gt, Gr

0 dbm

c

3×108 m/s

f

2.4 GHz

β

2
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III.5.3. WIRELESS DELAY
In this section the wireless delay for the system under study is calculated as in [71]

𝑇!"#$%$&& = 𝑇!"# +2×𝑇!"#! +    𝑇!!"#!$% + 𝑇! + 𝑇!"# + 𝑇!"#$ + 𝑇!"##

(7)

Where:
•

Twireless:

Wireless delay

•

Theaders :

Time taken by the headers of the medium access control

(MAC) layer and physical layer (PHY).
•

TCTS:

Time for a Clear-to-Send control message

•

TSIFS :

Time for a Short Inter-frame Space

•

TDIFS:

Time for Distributed Coordination Function Inter-frame
Space message

•

TACK :

Time needed for the acknowledgement message

•

TD :

Data propagation delay

•

TBOFF :

Time taken by the back off algorithm

Tcts and Tsifs are added to the equation proposed in [71] for wireless delay to
account for the use of the CTS-to-self mechanism.
To calculate the delay the payload of 10B, sampling period of 40ms, and channel
bandwidth of 54Mbps. The number of nodes is 60 (30 sensors and 30 actuators
accessing the same AP). These values provide the delay of data over the wireless
LAN as in (8).

T! =

𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒  ×  Number  of  Nodes    
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒

(8)

TDIFS and TSIFS periods are 28µs and 10µs respectively [20]. MAC, PHY headers
ACK and CTS sizes are transferred at the lowest data rate possible of 1Mbps [20].
Based on that, MAC and PHY header delays are 288µs, 112µs, respectively [20]. TCTS
is 112µs and TACK is 240µs [20].
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In order to calculate the back-off delay, the needed parameters are CWmin and slot
time [71, 20]. CWmin is 15 slots. The slot time is 9µs [20].
𝑇!"## = 0.5 ∗ 𝐶𝑊!"# ×𝑇!"#$

Where:
•

CWmin :

Minimum Contention window

•

Tslot :

slot time

Plugging all the data into (7), the wireless delay per air link is 3.11ms.
Table 5: Variables for wireless delay calculations

Variable

Value

Packet Size

10 bytes

Number of Nodes

60

Sampling period

40 ms

Bandwidth

54 Mbps

TDIFS

28µs

TSIFS

10µs

MAC header delay

288µs

PHY header delay

112µs

TCTS

112µs

TACK

240µs

CWmin

15 slots

Slot time

9µs
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(9)

III.5.4. SWITCHED ETHERNET DELAY
There are four components of the Ethernet delay: store, switch fabric, wire line and
queuing latency [25]. Those delays are represented through equations (10) to (13). In
order to calculate the queuing delay and the wire line delay, the network load is
calculated. The Network Load (NL) reflects the amount of data transmitted over the
network. This is calculated as shown in (10) [25].
The Network Load is represented by equation (10):

NL =

!"#$! ! !"#$!" ×! × !"#$%&'()  !"#$%"&&'%( !!"#$!  
!"##  !"#$%&'  !"#"$%&'

(10)

Where:
loads:

Sensor data

loadwd

Watchdog load

𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑! :

Data sent to the actuators

The Forward Store (FS) delay (𝑇!" ) is the size of the packets (𝑠) multiplied by the
number of packets (𝑛) divided by the rate (𝑟) of 1Gbps [25].
𝑇!" =

𝑠×𝑛
𝑟

(11)

The latency that results from the switch silicon and switch properties is Switch
Fabric (𝑇!" ) [25]
𝑇!" =

1
𝑃𝑟

(12)

𝑇!" is the delay required by the switch to service a packet. In the proposed model,
the Packet Service Rate (𝑃𝑟) is 500K packets/s).
The Queuing latency (𝑇! ) represents the percentage of the network load from the
full capacity of the network multiplied by the largest possible 𝑇!" . The latency is
calculated as follows [25]:
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𝑇! = 𝑁𝐿×𝑇!"

(13)

The Wire Line (WL) delay (𝑇!" ) represents the time taken by the data for
transmission. It is calculated as the distance divided by the transmission rate of the
line and this can be ignored for indoors distances as mentioned in [25].
The addition of the four types of delays are calculated per Ethernet link, and added
together to give the Ethernet delay.
𝑇!"!!"#!$ (𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ) = 𝑇!" + 𝑇!" + 𝑇! + 𝑇!"

𝑇!"#!!"!!"# = (𝑇!"#$%$&& + 𝑇!"!!"#!$ )×2

(14)

(15)

The total end-to-end delay would be the wireless delay and the Ethernet delay from
the sensor to controller and from controller to actuator. Hence it would be double the
addition of the wireless and Ethernet delay.

III.5.4.1. CALCULATION RESULTS
The calculations are held for the active and passive supervisor modes in both
states: fault-free and with faulty controllers.
The passive supervisor scenario in the fault-free state showed an end-to-end delay
of 8.92ms. The delay decreases to 8.17ms once a controller fails.
The decrease in delay is caused by the fact that when a controller fails, less data is
communicated over the wired Ethernet network. The need to send any data to the
failed controller is eliminated. Thus, the APs will only triple the sensor data, rather
than quadrupling.
When a second controller fails, the system will experience a slight increase in
delay to 8.49ms compared to one controller failure. The increase is due to the
direction of all the data loads to the third controller. Therefore, The third controller
claims the responsibility of its own load beside the loads of the other two controllers.
The loads cause some additional delay at the taking over controller. The additional
delay surpass the decrease in delay due to decreasing the data load on the whole
network, causing an overall slight increase in delay over the scenario with one
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controller failing. However, due to the decreased network load, the delay is still less
than the delay in the fault-free case.
The active supervisor mode has a delay of 7.85ms in the fault-free state. The delay
is reduced when one controller fails to reach 7.77ms. The slight decrease is due to the
reduction in data transmitted (no duplication). Unlike the case in the passive
supervisor, no increase occurred because the supervisor had no original load. When
two controllers fail, the delay will increase to be 8.38ms. The decrease in data was not
large enough to cover for the increase in delay due to the load on the supervisor.
The state when the three controllers fail and the supervisor takes over is common
between the passive and the active supervisor modes. When the supervisor takes over
all the control functions in the network, a delay of 8.81ms is encountered. In this case,
the APs send only one single stream to the supervisor in the absence of watchdog
packets are going through the network. The delay in the all fail scenario reflects the
need of one controller (in this case the supervisor) to manage all the data on the
network.
The active mode scenarios always give lower delay than the passive scenario;
except in the state when all three controllers fail as both modes equate. The reason of
the discrepancy is the fewer amounts of data loads required in the active supervisor
scenarios.
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III.6. SIMULATION RESULTS
The model proposed in Section III is simulated using OPNET Modeler [63]. The
system is replicated in two modes: passive supervisor mode and active supervisor
mode. The ability of the system to endure interference noise is tested. The model
benchmarks are to have zero packet drops and a maximum end-to-end delay of 36ms.
Theoretical and simulation end-to-end delays for different scenarios are calculated
and shown in Table 8. All simulation results are based on a 95% confidence analysis.
The model air fairness on the air link explained is section III.5.1, was checked
through checking the wireless delay as shown in Figure 16: Wireless Delay for All
Sensors and Actuators in One Cell. The delay oscillates between 3 to 4 ms, which is
close from the 3.11ms calculated.

Figure 16: Wireless Delay for All Sensors and Actuators in One Cell

III.6.1. PASSIVE SUPERVISOR
The passive supervisor could have one of eleven states mentioned in Table 6. It
starts operating with all controllers operating which is the fault-free scenario. Then
one controller could fail.
The failing controller could be K1, K2 or K3. In case K1 failed, K2 or K3 are
expected to takeover. In case K2 failed, K1 or K3 may takeover, while if K3 Fails, K2
or K1 would takeover.
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Figure 9 shows the symmetry in the network. The distance between the AP and K1
would be equivalent to distance between AP and K3. The distance between K1 and S
is the same as the distance between K3 and S. Hence; there are some scenarios that
would be equivalent to each other as their network load is the same and distance
between nodes are the same. The redundant scenarios are shown in Table 6.
Scenario A is the fault free scenario when all controllers and supervisor are
working. Scenario B represents the failure of one controller and the controller that
takes over is the controller on the adjacent cell. These cases could be when K1 fails
and K2 takes over, K2 fails and K3 takes over or K3 fails and K2 Takes over.
Scenario C represents the failure of one controller and the controller on the furthest
cell takes over. Scenario C is true in cases when K1 fails and K3 Takes over and when
K3 fails and K1 takes over.
Scenario D represents the cases when the two controllers, which failed, are
adjacent to each other. This means that one cell will be taken over by the closest
controller and another will be taken over by the nearest controller. This is satisfied for
scenarios when controller 1 and controller 2 fails and K3 takeover, or when K3 and
K2 fail and K1 takeover.
Scenario E represents the failure of two controllers far from each other, with the
taking over controller in between. This would be represented by the failure of K1 and
K3 where K2 takes over.
Scenario F represents the failure of all controllers and the supervisor would
takeover all control functions in the workcell.
The scenarios could be categorized as fault-free scenarios and scenarios where a
fault occurs on one or more controller. The fault-free scenario was simulated as
scenario A. The end-to-end delay was found to be between 4.29 and 8.73ms. The endto-end delay was similar to the delay from the theoretical equation. The difference
between the maximum of the confidence interval and the theoretical result was around
4.35%.
The data flow in the passive supervisor mode is explained in Section III. When all
controllers are working, the highest delay occurs. This happens because all APs are
quadrupling the sensor data streams to reach the three controllers and the supervisor.
Also, there is a watchdog packet transmitted between all controllers and each other
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and between the controller and the supervisor. The high amount of data exchanged on
the system would cause the delay to be highest.
The second set of scenarios represents cases where one or more controllers fail.
These are represented by scenarios B,C,D,E and F.
As a model of scenario B, the scenario where K1 fails and K2 takes over cell one
control functions is simulated. The delay in this scenario is expected to be within a
range between 3.57 and 7.26ms. This means the delay is less than delay in scenario A
by around 22.1%
Scenario C is modeled through the simulation of the failure of K1 fails and K3
takes over. This shows a decrease from fault free scenario by 26%. The decrease
happens due to the decrease in the load transmitted over the network. The difference
between K2 taking over and K3 taking over is not significant.
Scenario D is represented by the failure of K1 and K2 and K3 taking over the
controller functions of cells 1 and 2. In this case the delay is between 4.03 and
8.22ms. The delay is 13.7% more when compared to scenarios where one controller
only failed. However, the delay is still below the fault-free scenario by 11.9%.
Scenario E is simulated by K2 taking over the control functions of K1 and K3. The
delay simulated was between 4.22 and 8.60ms. The delay increases by 15.6%
compared to taking over one controller. The delay is below scenario A by 7.8%. The
increase could be explained by the trade-off between the decrease in network load and
having one controller takeover all the control work. When two controllers fail, there is
a decrease in delay due to the decrease in network load. However, a single controller
is doing the control functions of the two cells, which would mean that there would be
higher load at the controller taking over. It is shown that the control load increase in
delay was higher than the decrease of network load. Hence, there is an overall
increase in the delay when compared to one controller failing.
Scenario F is when the third controller fails, and the supervisor takes over all
control functions. A very slight increase of 1.5%, in comparison to scenarios when
two controller fail, occurs. The delay is between 4.29 and 8.73ms. The delay is still
below the fault-free scenario by 6.41%.
From this, it can be concluded that the effect of the data load on the delay is higher
than the effect of having one controller taking over the whole setup. This is because
although all data load is relieved from the network, when the supervisor alone takes
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over the whole control network, the delay is less than that when all controllers are
operating.
Table 6: Passive Supervisor redundant scenarios

Redundancy

Working

Failed

Taking over

A

K1,K2,K3,S

_

_

B

K2,K3,S

K1

K2

C

K2,K3,S

K1

K3

B

K1,K3,S

K2

K1

B

K1,K3,S

K2

K3

C

K1,K2,S

K3

K1

B

K1,K2,S

K3

K2

D

K1,S

K2,K3

K1

E

K2,S

K1,K3

K2

D

K3,S

K1,K2

K3

F

S

K1,K2,K3

S

Table 7: Active Supervisor redundant scenarios

Redundancy

Working

Failed

Taking over

G

K1,K2,K3,S

_

_

H

K2,K3,S

K1

S

I

K1,K3,S

K2

S

H

K1,K2,S

K3

S

J

K1,S

K2,K3

S

K

K2,S

K1,K3

S

J

K3,S

K1,K2

S

F

S

K1,K2,K3

S
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Table 8: Numerical analysis vs. Simulation results

Active

Passive

Scenario

Delay (ms)

Theoretical (ms)

All Fail S TO

[4.29;8.73]

8.81

Fault-Free

[4.58; 9.33]

8.92

K1 fail K2 TO

[3.57; 7.26]

8.17

K1 fail K3 TO

[3.48;7.09]

8.17

K1 & K2 fail K3 TO

[4.03:8.22]

8.49

K1 & K3 fail K2 TO

[4.22;8.60]

8.49

Fault-Free

[3.38; 6.88]

7.85

K1 fail S TO

[3.30; 6.73]

7.77

K2 fail S TO

[3.38;6.88]

7.77

K1 & K2 fail S TO

[3.67;7.48]

8.38

K1 & K3 fail S TO

[3.72;7.58]

8.38
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III.6.2. ACTIVE SUPERVISOR
The Active supervisor mode would operate either in fault-free mode or with one or
more faulty controllers. The active supervisor mode would always be in one of the
eight states mentioned in Table 3. At the beginning, all controllers operate normally,
which is the fault-free scenario. Then one or more controllers could fail. In all the
possible failure states, the supervisor would takeover.
The active supervisor system architecture and data flow was explained in Section
III.3. The sensors would send a stream of packets to the AP. The AP would duplicate
the data stream. The AP sends one stream to the controller of the work-cell, and
another to the supervisor. In case a controller fails, the supervisor takes over and the
AP does not duplicate data anymore. Watchdog packets are exchanged between
controllers and the supervisor but not between controllers. As in the passive
supervisor system, it can be fault-free or it may have one or more faulty controllers.
As explained in section III.6.1, there are some scenarios that are redundant due to
the similar network load and the symmetrical topology. The redundant active
scenarios are shown in Table 7. In order to distinguish between active and passive
scenario, numbering is continued from passive scenarios.
The fault-free scenario in the active supervisor is simulated as scenario G. The
main difference between scenario A and scenario G is the load on the network. In the
fault-free scenario, the maximum simulation delay is 6.88ms.
Scenario H is when one of the furthest controllers (either K1 or K3) to the
supervisor fail. Scenario I is when K2 fails. Scenario J is when two adjacent
controllers fail while scenario K is when two controllers far from each other fail.
The failure of the first controller was simulated using scenarios H where K1 fails
and scenario I when K2 fails. Supervisor takes over in all cases. As shown in Table 8,
scenarios H, G and I have very similar delay intervals. The failure of the first
controller (scenarios H,I) did not highly affect the delay, because the load per
controller is the same and the data load decrease is very slight.
Scenario J is simulated as K1 and K2 failure. Scenario K is simulated as the failure
of K1 and K3. The difference between both scenarios is shown to be slight. When two
controllers fail, the delay increases in comparison to the fault-free by 8% to 9%. The
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increase in delay due to the supervisor taking over two controllers was higher than the
decrease in delay due to the decrease in data load.
Scenario F represents the failure of all controllers and the supervisor taking over.
This case is the same in both active and passive supervisor mode. When three
controllers fail, the delay increases by 13% to 14% compared to the failure of two
controllers. The failure of the three controllers shows the effect of having one
controller taking over all three cells at the lowest data loads.
The difference between the theoretical and the simulation results is due to different
factors like the assumptions of full fairness explained in Section III.E and taking
worst-case scenarios while calculating the theoretical data.

III.6.1. COMPARING PASSIVE AND ACTIVE SUPERVISORS
The active supervisor configuration showed better delays than the passive
supervisor in both theoretical and simulation results. In the fault-free case, the active
supervisor system shows a delay improvement by around 26%. The main difference
between the fault-free scenario in active and passive supervisor is the data load. The
reduction of the amount of data exchanged in the active scenario, as mentioned,
lowers the delay on the active supervisor network
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III.7. INTERFERENCE
One of the main disadvantages of wireless systems over wired system is being
susceptible to interference. Hence, to insure a wireless system is fully functional the
system has to prove to be resilient to interference.
As mentioned in section II.2.1.1, the factory floor noise will not interfere with the
communication on the Wi-Fi WNCS system. Hence, only interference in the ISM
band would affect the system. In section II.4, all the possible types of interference on
a Wi-Fi NCS system were explored. The three types were medium congestion,
network congestion and jammers. The study in section II.4, proved jammers to be the
most damaging type of interference, so it will be used to model interference.
Due to multicasting, the loads on the air link on all scenarios A-J are the same.
Therefore, the effect of interference on all scenarios will be the same. Hence, only the
scenario with the worst delay will be considered for interference. As shown in Table
8, it is the fault-free passive supervisor mode
To model interference, a single band jammer with inter-arrival time of 0.5ms
would be directed over the full Wi-Fi spectrum. For the sake of experimenting,
quantifying and comparing the jammer in the experiment is considered as ideal that
would send a certain file size at a constant interval. The jammer blocks the 2.4 GHz
band. The jammer would go around the perimeter of the three workcells. The path of
the jammer simulated is shown in Figure 18. The jammer is set to send a certain file
size, then experiment repeated with a smaller file size till the maximum size that does
fulfills the delay benchmark of 36ms and causes no drops is found. The simulation
will determine the system’s susceptibility to interference and quantify the interference
level that can be tolerated without violating the time constraint or dropping data.
Figure 17 show that delays increase when the jammer starts working and, after the
jammer is off, delays recovers back to their original values. The x-axis represents the
Simulation Time while the y-axis represents the observed Delay.
Simulations showed that the maximum size of allowable jammer interference is
8KB. This size will keep the end-to-end delays below the 36ms constraint without any
packet loss.
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Figure 17: Effect of Jammer on Simulation [65]

Figure 18: OPNET Simulation for Interference
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IV. PERFORMABILITY
The difference between the measured delay and the benchmarking delay is
considered to be an indicator of the system robustness as shown in [22]. As the
difference gets bigger, it is less likely that the system would go beyond the
permissible delay level.
Transient performability was used in [59,22] to measure the robustness of the
system. First, a reliability model was built using the Continuous Time Markov Chain
(CTMC). Second, a reward was assigned to each state. The reward was calculated as
the difference between the average end-to-end delay in that state and the maximum
allowable delay. The rationale behind the choice of this reward system is that the
difference between the system deadline and the maximum observed end-to-end delay
indicates the robustness of the system.
The performability of the system studied in this paper would follow the same
technique followed in [59].

IV.1. MARKOV MODEL
The Markov model of the system is shown in Figure 19. The model represents the
operation of the hierarchical fault-tolerant architecture described in this research. For
the purpose of this study, the supervisor is assumed to be the most reliable node on
the network and hence is expected to fail last. Based on this assumption, the Markov
model has five states. The explanation of each of the five states as well as the
transition of each state is described below.
First state for the system is {3K+S}. The system starts in a fault-free state when all
the three controllers are fully operation; each is taking over its own tasks. The
supervisor in this state is just watching over for the controllers but not taking any
control loads itself.
It is assumed that three controllers are identical, hence all have same failure rate λk
and that the Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) is exponentially distributed [57]. Based on
the assumption the rate of the transition from state {3K+S} to state {2K+S} is 3λk. It
will be the rate of failure of any of the three controllers. Note that the Mean Time to
Failure (MTTF) is equal to (1/λk).
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Due to the assumption that the three controllers are identical, they are
considered to have the same repair rate of µk. It is needed to repair one controller in
order to move back to state {3K+S} with a rate of µk. The repair time is assumed to
have an exponential distribution and the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) is equal to
(1/µk).

Figure 19: Markov Model [74]

In case a controller failed before the first controller was repaired the system moves
from State {2K+S} to State {1K+S}. The transition rate in this case is 2λk since any
of the two remaining controllers might fail.
The transition back from State {1K+S} to State {2K+S} happens if any of the two
faulty controllers were repaired. This would need a transition equal to 2µk. It is
assumed that there are 2 repair persons are available [57].
With a single operational controller, the system moves to state {0k+S} at a rate of
λk. In this state, the supervisor carry out all of the control function on the production
line as none of the controllers is functional. In case any of the three failed controllers
is repaired before the failure of the supervisor, the system moves back to State
{1K+S} at a rate of 3µk (assuming three repair persons).
In case the supervisor fails before any of the three controllers is repaired, the entire
system fails and goes to State {F}. Given that the supervisor was assumed to fail last,
its reliability is assumed to be relatively higher than the controllers. The failure rate of
the supervisor is λs. The transition rate between States {0K+S} and {F} is λs. Residing
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in the {F} state means that the entire production line has failed. An assumption is
made that the management will wait until all faults are repaired to take the system
back to its fully operational State {3K+S}. The rate of this transition is µsys.
To simplify the following explanation, states {3K+S}, {2K+S}, {1K+S}, {S} and
{F} will be represented as states 4, 3, 2, 1 and 0. Let P! (t) be the probability of
residing in state i (i = 4, 3, 2, 1, 0) at time t. Let T be the Transition Rate Matrix. The
transient probability of residing in any of the five states can be calculated using the
following Chapman-Kolmogorov equations as follows [57]:

−3λ!
µμ!
T= 0
0
µμ!"!

dP
= P×T
dt

(16)

P = P!   P!   P! P!   P!

(17)

3λ!
−2λ! − µμ!
2µμ!
0
0

0
2λ!
−2µμ! − λ!
3µμ!
0

0
0
λ!
−3µμ! − λ!"!
0

0
0
0
λ!"!
−µμ!"!

(18)

dP!
= −3λ! . P! + P! . µμ! + P! . µμ!"!
dt

(19)

dP!
= 3λ! . P! + P! . (−2λ! − µμ! ) + P! . 2λ!
dt

(20)

dP!
= 2λ! . P! + P! . (−2µμ! − λ! ) + P! . 3µμ!
dt

(21)

dP!
= λ! . P! + P! . (−3µμ! − λ!"! )
dt

(22)

dP!
= λ!"! . P! − P! . µμ!"!
dt

(23)
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The initial conditions at t= 0 are assumed that the system is fully functional; hence
it is assumed that the system is in state 4. Therefore, P! (0) = 1 and P! 0 =
P! 0 = P! 0 = P! 0 = 0. The Chapman-Kolmogorov equations can be solved to
obtain Pi(t) for i = 4, 3, 2, 1, 0.
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IV.2. REWARD AND PERFORMABILITY
One of the important metrics to assess the robustness of a fault-tolerant system is
performability. Performability takes into account component failures and the
performance, simultaneously.
Performability study starts with a Markov model as a first step. The second step,
each state is assigned a reward or a penalty. The same strategy applied in [22, 59] is
used. The reward will be equal to the difference between the system end-to-end delay
in any state and the benchmark deadline. The benchmark deadline for the system is
36ms. The larger the difference is, the better the robustness and performance of the
system. The delays were measured with OPNET simulation with a 95% confidence
analysis. Table 9 shows the upper bounds of the confidence interval for the end-to-end
delays of the system in the passive mode. Table 10, shows the same values for the
active mode. As the delay approaches the 36ms benchmark, the packets experiences a
higher risk of missing the allowable deadline.
Table 9: Reward per state for passive supervisor

State

Highest End-to-End

Reward

Delays (ms)

(ms)

{3K+S}

9.33

26.67

{2K+S}

7.26

28.74

{1K+S}

8.6

27.4

{0K+S}

8.73

27.27
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Table 10: Reward per state in Active supervisor

State

Highest End-to-End

Reward (ms)

Delays (ms)
{3K+S}

6.88

29.12

{2K+S}

6.88

29.12

{1K+S}

7.58

28.42

{0K+S}

8.73

27.27

As mentioned in section III.6.1 and section III.6.2, there are some identical
scenarios under each state and some different scenarios. The highest delay among the
all the possibility will be used to calculate the reward for each State to obtain the
worst-case performability.
The Transient Performability TP(t) is calculated as follows [59]:
!

TP t =

P! (t)×R !
!!!

where Ri is the reward associated with State i.
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(24)

IV.2.1. CASE STUDY
Based on the methodology outlined in Section IV.2, a case study was carried out to
compare between the performability of the active and passive supervisor modes for
the hierarchical WNCS. The tool used to carry out the analysis is SHARPE [73]. It
was used to carry out the performability analysis based on the Markov model and the
values for the reward per state for each of the passive and active modes as in Table 9
and 10 respectively The failure rates λk and λs used were 1months-1 and 0.25months-1,
respectively. The difference between the two values is due to the assumption that the
supervisor is more robust than the controllers. Moreover, the repair rates µk and µsys
were used as 2months-1 and 1months-1 respectively. The explanation to the difference
is the assumption that if the supervisor fails, the management will wait till the full
system is repaired. It is expected that the repair time µsys will be larger as the repair
time of the entire system would be greater than the repair time of a single controller.
Figure 20 illustrates the resulting performability curves over time for both the active
and passive supervisor modes.

Figure 20: Performability vs. Time (Active vs. Passive)
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IV.2.1.1. PASSIVE SUPERVISOR
Equation (24) shows the Transient Probability (TP) calculation. TP is calculated as
the summation of the result of multiplying the probability of residing in a state by the
reward of the state. The reward (r) of being at any state is the difference between the
benchmark delay and the delay simulated. The delay used is the maximum end-to-end
delay between the sensors and actuators using a 95% confidence analysis.
The end-end delay is 9.33ms in the first state {3K+S}, when all controllers are
functional. When one controller fails, the second state {2K+S} has six available
alternatives. The failing K could be K1, K2 or K3. One of the two functional
controllers would takeover, so each K has two possible scenarios of takeover. Due to
symmetry, failures of the first and third controller have same delays.
As shown in Table 7, the failure of one controller and being taken over by its
neighbor is equivalent to the opposite case, when the neighbor fails and be taken over
by the controller. Hence, there are two distinctive options for state {2K+S}; either
controller 1 failing and controller 2 taking over or controller 1 failing and controller 3
taking over. The higher of the two delays was the delay of the state where controller 1
failed which was 7.26ms. For the third state {K+S}, the available possible scenarios
after eliminating symmetrical options would be either failure of controller 1 and
controller 2 or failure of controller 1 and 3. The scenario with the higher delay was
the failure of Controller 3 and controller 1. In the final state, when all controllers fail
{S} only one value of the delay is available of 8.73ms. The highest possible delay of
each state in passive supervisor scenario is shown in Table 1.
Figure 20 shows the performability of the passive supervisor mode. The
performability of the system is at its lowest at t = 0. In other words, the worst
performance of the system occurs at fault-free state. The main reason for that is the
amount of data transmitted from the all the sensors on the three workcells being
quadrupled over the wired backbone. In addition, watchdog packets are exchanged
between controllers and each other and between controllers and the supervisor. The
reason for quadrupling and watchdog signals is that all the controllers and the
supervisor be aware of the last state of the system in order to provide for the needed
takeover at any point of failure. Based on that, the delay of the overall packet end-to58

end in the fault-free scenario is higher than the delays of scenarios with faulty
controllers, which does not require the same amount of data.
As such, the experienced overall packet end-to-end delays are higher than in the
faulty scenarios, which do not require as much packet duplication. The observed
performability of the passive supervisor mode stabilizes over time to around 27.53ms.

IV.2.1.2. ACTIVE SUPERVISOR
The delays for the active supervisor states are calculated the same way as delays in
passive supervisor. Symmetrical cases are eliminated to leave the following states, All
controller functional in {3K+S}, failure of controller 1 or controller 2 with the
supervisor taking over to represent state {2K+S}, and failure of controllers 1 and 2 or
1 and 3 to represent the {K+S} state and all controllers fail in state {S}. The highest
delay of each state is chosen to represent the delay of the state and shown in Table 2.
The same values for λ! ,   λ!"! ,   µμ!"!   and  µμ!   were used as in the passive supervisor
performability analysis. The curve for TP(t) was drawn based on the active reward
shown in Table 2.
From Figure 3, it can be noticed that the performability of the active supervisor
mode is at its highest at t = 0. Thus, the active mode offers the best performance
during the fault-free state. As controllers start to fail, all traffic is rerouted to the
supervisor node, which becomes responsible for the control of all failed cells. The
added network delays result in an increase in overall packet end-to-end delay and
consequently lower performance. The observed performability of the active
supervisor mode stabilizes over time to around 28.65ms.
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V. CONCLUSION
There is a trend to replace wired control system by wireless networked control
system in factory automation. The main reasons for that trend is the robustness and
flexibility offered by the wireless option. A wireless workcell communication for
factory automation was proposed in earlier literature. The workcell was composed of
30 sensors, 30 actuators communicating wirelessly through 802.11 Technology to
AP(s). The AP(s) is wired to the controller of the cell through switched Ethernet.
The presented research studied the addition of a supervisor to a version of the WiFi WNCS cell. The Wi-Fi WNCS cell represented a conveyer belt with 3 work-cells.
Each workcell has 30 sensors, 30 actuators and communicated via 802.11g with a
single AP. The AP is connected to a switch, which is connected to all the controllers
of the three cells, in order to provide for a fault tolerance over the controller level. The
AP is connected to the switch using switched Ethernet technology.
In this thesis, multicasting was applied to the system to allow for better
performance. Multicasting allowed each sensor to send one stream of packets to the
access point instead of duplicates of streams. The AP would do the needed duplication
and would forward through switched Ethernet to the designated controllers.
There are two possible modes for the supervisor to handle the control: passive or
active. If the supervisor is passive, the controller refrain from participating in the
control scheme till all controllers fail. At that point, the controller would intervene
and carry the control load of the whole system. The other mode is active supervisor.
In active supervisor, once any controller fails, the supervisor would intervene to
handle the control load.
The system was simulated using OPNET software with 95% confidence analysis.
Through mathematical delay calculations and OPNET simulations it was proved that
active supervisor performance provided a better performance.
The ability of the system to withhold external interference was assessed through
adding a single band jammer to the OPNET simulation. The system was able to hold
up to 8KB interfering file sent from a single band jammer affecting the full Wi-Fi
spectrum. All results were subjected to a 95% confidence analysis
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The performability of passive and active supervisor systems was compared. A
Markov model of both systems was created. The model showed five states, state were
all controllers and supervisor are functional, state were two out of three controllers
and the supervisor are functional, one controller and supervisor functioning, only the
supervisor functioning, then total system failure state.
The supervisor was assumed to be the most robust node on the network hence the
failure rate of the supervisor was considered much less that that of the controller.
Moreover, it was assumed that if the supervisor fails the management would wait till
the full system is back on air. Thus, the repair rate of the supervisor is expected to be
much higher.
The transient probabilities for each system were calculated. The probability of
residing at each state was multiplied by the reward of residing at that state. The results
of products of all states were summed up together to give the transient probability.
The reward was considered as the difference between the benchmark of 36ms and the
system delay. As the difference increases, the system is considered more robust, as the
probability of a packet exceeding the benchmark decreases.
In order to compare the performability of a hierarchical passive and active
supervisor, a case study was carried out based on the methodology mentioned. It was
shown that by time, the performability of a passive supervisor system is enhanced
while that of an active supervisor system degraded. However, the active supervisor
showed a better performability in all cases.
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APPENDIX – CONFIDENCE ANALYSIS
All results subjected to a confidence analysis follow the following calculations.
Let:
X:

random variable (maximum end-to-end delay).

µ:

Average of X

σ2: Variance of X
Xi:

sample of X obtained during it OPNET simulation (using different seed)

n:

No. of OPNET simulations

x:

Sample mean

s2 :

Sample variance

!

𝑥=!

(1)

!

!!
!!!

1
𝑠! =
𝑛−1

!

𝑋! − 𝑥

(2)

!

!!!

OPNET Network Modeler requires a ‘seed’ value. The value is used to generate
different random number generator equations. The equations help to simulate the
behavior of non-deterministic aspects. If the distribution of a random variable is
unknown, the distribution of its sample mean will approach a normal distribution, as
the number of samples increases based on the Central Limit Theorem (CLT). The
sample mean also approaches the ensemble mean and the variance of the sample
mean is a scaled version of the ensemble mean (mean of x = µ = mean of X and
variance of x= σ x2 =

σ2
n

where σ2 = variance of X [32, 49].

Therefore, the confidence level is defined as the probability that x is below a
certain distance from µ:

𝑧=

𝑥−𝜇
𝜎!

(3)
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z:

is a normal random variable (mean= 0 & variance = 1).
(4)

𝑃 −𝑧! < 𝑧 < 𝑧! = 𝛼

𝑃

(5)

𝑥−𝜇
< 𝑧! = 𝛼
𝜎!

By using 33 simulations, n > 30 and hence the sample standard deviation s can be
used instead of σ as it is difficult to find σ x =

σ
n

. The Normal distribution will be used

and z is calculated for a confidence level α = 95%.
α
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